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no, ^^ fO
The Federal I'oi^or Commission can he rretJI te<1 with nutatflndinp
administrative performance in the pane decade. l.onf* knoim as the
independent regulatory commission \-rith the h^fhest itand.irds for lecal
procedtlTfpR and rulemaking, the Commission had bpcny^ paralyzed hv Its
c^'Tn reqtilrements for detailed analysis and rpviev vhen faroi^ T'lfb
setting prices for thousands of natural ras fifld "^alop oarh voar.
Karly in the l^fiO's^ hos^ever, the Commission invont^'d rh*» means for
clearing out t.h<? natural gas rases, and by May of 10^8 the Supreme
Coiirr had affirmed this "area rate" process of rc^^iewin" 1ar?e numbers
of j»as field sales in a sinf.le case ot docket. At the same time, wider
jurisdiction had been claimed by the Commission over I'hnlesale distri-
bution of electricity; In the words of one electricity companv execu-
tive, "the Commission, under Clialrmen Swidlpr and 'Jhite, rrpatly
extended the roncept of what constlttited an intfrstato sale. ., [while]
many state Commissioners still assert [ed] dtiplirnte inrisdi ction over
such sales." Here afaln the Commission set out findtnps in earlv
cases that set standards for due process under nevj and extended
regulation.
V.'hile the Commission mana<>,ed to get npvr typ''s of dockets com-
pleted, they have not been able entirely to disp"! concern over the
effectiveness of reftulation. The new decade has bet^tm with prognos-
tications of shortage of nattiral p,as, not onl" in tlif> tride magazines
2
but also in a report from the Commission's crm Burenu of Natural "^as.
Private correspondence, dated November IP, l'*'i'>.
2
Rtireau of Natural Has, A Staff Report on "Jation al Grxs Runnlv and
Demand (Vfashington , D.C., The Federal Poi-re'- Commission, September 1969),
>^'ir=ntrc

The elertrlr pr«^»«»r proHticers not-? lack the rart.Trl*:" to nroiflHc nonVin,"
sfirvicr In a ntimber of major population r^ntfyr'^ tJi;>t hr^i} Uf>rv arrtif-
toniod to siirh service, Re?»u]ation has bf'en p.ivfn r»,Trt of th'^ rosnon-
«lblHty for such an outlook in thesR ind<«stripfi. At 1p,is'- the
possibility exists that the Poio'er Cormission ha*; Ho\f1<;p<i adnirable
procoHures for achlevinp econoTnlrnlly depToriMf^ rnsultP.
This essay bej»lns the invnstifr^fo" "^^ :««ir'i a possibility.
The Corwiisslon is viewed as an orp.ani zation nsiof^ resources .nnd com-
mandinf their use by others for the purpose, of rhanrin'' inrones and
oiitputs In electricity and ;^as marketSo The tii'ir '^rame of reference
Is a sin",le fiscal year in the. late lOftO's^ so that — axcopt in case
of "new" gas field and electricitv refulation — the costs and benefits
are fron one short run period of onpoinp acti^/ities of the a^rencv.
The analytic fraine of reference is the concept of efficiency - of
gaining the most In services or outnuts deslre^^ hv cons'ir^ers for ex-
penditure<5 on re«ulation.
These are rather narrow fraineworks. Tn deterF'lne whether the
rommission covilH have effectively spent nnrn or les<! in the last Fiscal
Year is not to document the «»ains from re^tt] ^itlon in the lonf; run.
The reason for doinfr this limited study is that nnantitative evidence
can be brought to bear on the question of whether there would be net
f»alns from a larper or smaller Federal Poi^er Commission. The evidence
At least accusations are made in the mapa^ines, if not the publica-
tions of the Federal Poorer Comrnissi on's Rurean of Natural Has. Cf.
Anthony Liversidpe "Not Hnoufh Has in the Pine]ines'\ '^o-tune Mapazlne
Vol. I.XXX //n, p. 120 et.seq. (November 1^69) and Jeremv Main "A Peak Load
of Trouble for Htilities", p. 116 et. sen. in the same issue. Cf. also
F..W. Kitch, "Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Cas by The Fed-
eral PC'jer Commission" The Journal of T,aw and i:rononirs ^October 1968)
pp. 2A1-28(); at 278 the author concludes "Tn the field market the regu-
lation X7i 1 1 only rause the loss of "as whic'' would othen^ise be nroduced.
In the consumer markets the possible conaeqtinnces ire even more disturbing

remains tn be discovered that would make It possible to judee the
economic pains from havlnp any Commission at all.
The last section of this essay contains sone conclusions on
whether the "scale" of regulatory activities In p,as or wholesale
electricity is "over- extended". Tentative proposals are made for
changing prcedures or criteria for repeal ated prices so as to rediice
the costs of regulation or to add to consumer f>alns at present costs.
But these are tentative because Commission rules are rhanplnp. De-
cisions are not based on standards that are consistent or dlscemable.
Even If the Cornmisslon is erratic in its decisions, hw-rever, these
conclusions are important since thev are based on the latest Commission
decisions. In that case, any reversal In later decisions would have
implications in direct contrast to those of past decisions.
Where this exercise does lead to proposals for economic reform,
then the question remains as to what exact Iv should be done. If the
Commission Is "inefficient" in an economic sense, then It does not
follo«j that Congress or the Commission should male changes. Full
requirements for economic efficiency could not nosslbly be nut Into
effect, since the Commission was not brought into th«» world ca<?t In
such a mold nor was it Riven a mandate to acquire what It had not
inherited. But there mi^ht be little objection to nakinj^ chanties
in Commission procedures v/hlch add to economic f^fflciency, as lonj^ as
these do not restrict the lepal rlf^hts and nrerof'ati ves of the parties
to regulation. This argument at least Is one source of ontlmism, In
the face of foreboding, forecasts for conditions in the electricity
and pas Industries In the 1970' s.

Kffirlenrv In Reptil .-^tlon
The Independent reptilatory comtnis^inn hr><5 « rnndnfe from
Cnnr;resR and the Federal ennrts tn yirnvii^c a complex 'et of services
to the indiistrv wltli which It is concerned, and tll^i^^a^el^' to con-
«5«iners of the final products of that indu^^tn'. Tlie comm1«5';ion covild
he found to be "efficient", In the technical sen^se of the tern, if
there were no alternative way of providing the f»i ven ref,n1 ator>'
services at lo"^er annual expenditures of Ped^ral fnnds. Rrit this is
a narrw^' definition of efficiency, aince the n os <; ib il i tv evists that
the CoTTiTTiispi on is mininizinf nnrelv 1er»al and administrit i ve cost<!
of promuljjatinp an tmwanted or unnecessary set of rules.
The direct costs of the CoiriTnlsslon ar" not total costs of
regulation. The Commission at any tine could shm^ redticed expenses
hv rulemakinp, that required the companies Heinp regulated to hear
additional costs, or that required final consumers to l)rinp cases.
The Commission could spend a preat deal less hy carrvinp o^^^ their
usual activities at r sloi-yer rate. Roth possihi H ties sh^^'^T that the
expenses of all parties involved in regulator]' r-roc-r-'Hn",'^ should he
considered the observable "costs of regulation" in anv ».'el l-def^ned
time frame of reference. There are indirect costs - especially
involved in delay - vrhich are reflected in higher prices for final
goods and services. Thev should be incltided in the final balance
sheet for the Commission.
The activities of the Commission are sup'-'osod to nrr\\'r> hetne—
ficial to the consumer and to the economy as a "ho^e. Commissions in
reneral atp orp;ani zatlons for Hmitinf business d'^cislons^ or for

preventing the ocrurrence of rertaln p«ttern«5 of mnrkof hphivior in
particular industries. The CommlaRlnn' s ser'Mre ^ «? t>ie nonornirrence
of p;»rticular 1e\«>ln of prir*^, r<T p«rt4 rrl -^r qu-iMries of nrnriucts.
It could he involved as t^e]l in desl cn.it'fnT fhe qonrro*? pnH .-iwonnts
of products, The benefits to Rocietv can be moasured by the differ-
ence between the value imder repulatinn of the- econoirvVs j'oods and
services ^nd that value when the prohibited pr-tttems occur. There
are all kinds of meastirea of value, but the rneasure allni^inf^ cornnsrison
with expenditures Is the dollar "surplus", thit amotmt of money which
constitners and producers together would be wllHnp to ns" o\rer and
above the actual amotmt Involved in transactions, in order to main-
tain the conditions from re^^ulation, Flndinp this in a particular
case is difficult; but the approach of measurinf the surnlus by areas
under demand ftmctlons q * f(P) for quantity q and price P on rej»ulated
products is not always unsnccessftil in tuminfr up an estimate of
value for policy analysis. The rnmmission is efficient if it is
providing services at least cost, and if the ser^^ ces restilt in
dollar consumer and producer surplus preater tHnn the'^^^ rosf.
The Federal Poi.?er Commission's day-to-da" activities are v^ry
looselv orj^anized around a few lonp;-establisbed "ublic policies, fiven
in tlie FPfleral Poi-rer Art of TJIS and the Natural Cf\s Act of 1938 and
restated by the courts In thirty years of precedent decisions. One
policy is protection of consu!Tw«rs afainst prire's »-hat are "unreasonable"

anH "iinHnlv Hi srrlminatory" . To ptif this poli rv Into of^^^rt en.
wholesale HiRfrihutinn of pot«rer arif' nat'iral r-''^ , *^he Cornni'^'^i on ha"5
f.enerally required th«t the rorip.tnles* averajre prices ho pq»\al to
averfljre "costs of service", howevpr these costs or> T'holesale servicp
are discovered in general cost accotmtino: records. V\rr>v nore exnctly,
prices for ssles in a specific contract OMfht to he set close to msrs
of "service, hecntise the "cost of service formnls is the one best adapted
in de^ertninin^» .jnst and reasonable rates in thir industry where costs
2
are kncwjn."
The protection of the constimer fron nrlce-cost di sn.ir'' ties
has not been the only policy in regulation, 'Hie Federal Por.'er Conmi sslor".
was -^iven the task of "asstirinp, ivn abundant supnlv rf einctric pner^v
throMp.hout the United States with the greatest nosslble econoiw and
with re",ard to the proper utilization and conservation of natural
res'^urceo" In Section 20? of the Federal PmJer Act . Public -tnter-
vention to provide more service at hlcher ^nalitv vas even more direct
In the Natural Cas Act; here the Connrlssi on C!r^ and should require
as shown by the more recent court decisions; cf. T.V.C. rrg. Southern
Callfomia Fdlson Company 376 U.S. 205 (IQ^A) on the iuri sdi ction and
standards of the Commission for electricity prices, and F.P.C. vs.
Northern Natural Cas Company 3A6 U.S. 022 (lOSA") for "costs of service"
and prices of natural j'as pipeline companies,
in the matter of Soiith Carolina '^eneratlnr Company Ki ^.P.C. 52
(1<)56) at S8. The qualifyinp clause "where costc r^rc Inown" is im-
portant; in the many instances when there are widely var^inf estimates
of costs, prices are not set equal to one of these estimates. The
best characterization of the peneral relation is that "costs of ser-
vice" provide a lower bound for prices susrepted of beinr too Iw
and discriminatory, and a much more approximate upper hound for
prices found to be "too hinh".

improvenent and extenston of a pipeline's service when It is In the
public Interest. The emphasis on quality has in fact annoareH in
F.P.C. certification of new facilities for prodiicinj» electricity and
trjjnsporting pas ~ here detailed reviews aro madf of the entrant's
financial rcsotirces and fuel capacity to "meet the demands which it
is reasonable to expect will arise." Also, the Cormnission has become
involved in the planning and forecastinp processes in these Indtistrles,
to a very limited extent "encouraj',in.'»" coordination in the operation
or growth of larj^er systems.
The "price" and "quality" policies need not he the same when
put into effect in the Commission's onfoin<» surveillance and case
activities. The price reductions captured by a vear's work can be
characterized by a movement from P. to P^ in Firtire 1; that is, buvers
in the absence of the Commission's onf»olnf^ sunw^illnnce activities
would find prices "creepin«^ up" to P. or pricas "falling to be redticed"
to P . but with a vear's re<»ulatorv vicilanre ( ?<nd expenditure on
2
surveillance and Htij'ation) price would necessaril" he at P . The
pains for the consumers from repulation are shown as
'^^^-^2-*'^i
^'^^^^
Q is the amount of service demanded at the higher price; at least
' Cf. in the matter of Kansas Pipeline and OaF; rotrrrany and North
Dakota Consuners r.as Company , 2 F.P.C. ?9 (1Q39).
The price would presumably be higher than this representative Pj
if the Commission were abolished , hrnfTever. Tt is assumed here that
the Commission 1^ iji operation , but at a much reduced level of ex-
penditures on compliance , when P-j is in effect. In fact, the upper
limit of P, woTtld be a price le^/el clearly In violation of the pre-
cedents set by previous F.P.C. court cases dea]inr» with that industry,
so that a case without surveillance information could he brought if
that level were exceeded.

rhls ts all thaf hn«5 been clat»fled bv the "PcH'^fr Tomnl s<5l on cm 1nter«»tflte
pas and wholesale elertrtcity sale?).
Flpure 1
price
unit costs of service
Q^ Q„ Q» qtiantlty depimiHed
per year
But these pains in area "A" are not the onlv po«?slble benefits frow
regulation.
riven that consumers' demands are represented by the nepatively-
sloped demand ciirve D, the Commission-induced pric<=» redtirtions Increase
the cuantitv demanded from Q to Q . Thlg tmcov^rs n serond consigners'
pain, shown as area "R", that is not derived from income redistribution.

This Is the dollar erjuivnlent to what consiiiners wotilH pay for
(Qt - Q ) over and abovp actual payment P-j(Q^ ~ ^i^ rathor than rn
back to price P and qtiantlty <^ . As stich , It Is nn incr^-nse In the
"qiialitv of service" derived from direct pricp refilarion and should
acconpany the area "A" benefits from "protprfiop of tho ronstimor".
The direct pursn-tt of "quality" is n^t by means of r^ri ce
reductions, ho«>7ever, Tncreasin*' the accessibility and rpliabilitv
of service, by rep;u]atlnf the form and scale o^ capaci tv additions,
should shift out demand from D to D*, This tin roarers consumers' sur-
plus shown by the area "C"
,
and increases the qnantit" demanded to Q^,
Such pains may be had only at Increased "costs of service", however,
so that thev are available onlv at prices hlfher than P Thev not
2
only do not accompany' reductions in price p but in some ca«es are not
realized if price is not maintained at the hlfher level.
See D. M. Winch, "Consumers' Surnlus and tlie Comnensation Princinle",
American Kconomic Review
,
vol. 55, pp. 395-A2 3 (1965). These fains are
not rn be realized unless certain conditions are present. First,
prices have to be preater than the total economic costs of the addi-
tional output. The measured "costs of service" »re not marginal costs,
except by chance equality of accountinf^ overhead allocation with the
opportunity costs of usinf fixed factors in this nroduction. There
is no way of making certain that this condition is met, by recourse
to re<»ulatory accountin<^ information. A second qualifying* condition
is as important: the ZAPAQ measure is a food measure of af predate
fains of consumers only If their distribution fo ^oryp and not to
others is judped to he acceptable. Here everv dollar is taken to be
of equal social valtie, no matter who receives it — the steel company
using <jas or electricity for production, or the noor wi den-?-orphan
usin?; It for lifht and heat.
^ The analytical basis for this contradiction is shrwn in
R. L. Schmalensee "Regulation and the Durability of Goods", The Bell
loumal of Economics and Management Science, vol. 1, //I, Snrinf, 1970,
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Thp critlcnl qiipsrion i« vJiether rniv of t1if«"» "^"afi'irpi c«n
.'^^^na11v bp nserl to m^ke fhe case for the rprnlntoi"" statti*? nun or
alternatively for rej^iilatory refori", Tn thp rpprp-spntati vp regula-
tory commission, the Information pr<><lnrpH -(n the repul ator^r nrocpsn
1 <? not for the ntirpose of making' "^uch aRsessments and i '•• not nqpful
for doinj; so, Tliis Is tme for hoth co?Tts anH ".^^n<:.
Thp costs of commlsnlnn operations are ralcnlatpH in stral'^ht-
forvard accotmtinp fashion in the hndtret and expenditure review <\p-
partments of the Federal novernmpnt, Hnt no a'^ae-^snipnt is nade of
costs imposed on thp rec'ilated firms •=--= the rets of defpn^se or intei
—
vention in the re<»iilatory proreedlnps.
Estimates of benefits depend oritirallv m detailed information
OP market prices and ntiantities in the absenr** as "ell is thp 'irpsence
of the ont^oinf^ ref^iiTator" snrveillnnre and accountint? artivitips.
Often there is some information on market behavior hpfore and after
some surveillance activity took nlare, A r'ood part of this information
is nmhif;uoiis, because it Ip not s<iffi cientlv dptiiled to alio" sr>para-
tion of increases in dpmand as the mark«^t nrow<5 froTi rhanc»p<5 in
quantity demanded (where the latter follow,; from nrire rpd',ictlon'= re-
sultinc' from this activity). Also, prices aftf'r rP"ulatr.r>T curveillanre
are relatpd to "costs of servicp". Thp ral cul /ition of "costs of service"
of the regulated companies Is so arhltrar^' that it i ^ not rlp,ir whether
flndin;^ them leads to price reductions. Thp basir nrnhlen in the cal-
culation is the allocation of ^ oint capital p-<nenrH turf's amonf recipients
of differenct kinds of service; there are no rules by which thp resviltinp
unit costs can be mad'' to approximate the economic costs on
which unrefulated prires will ho sot.
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In penernl the ralculatlons by the Commission or hv omHurlnf firms
of the "costs of service" — equal to variable costs nlns an alloca-
tion of undepreciated capital expenditures — may approximate unre-
yulated prices, just as easily a« they ma>' annroylmate Inn" term
economic costs so as to lead to Irr^er rofulati^d "ricf^. l.-'st of all,
the Information on "quality" of servl.ce Is In most cases llmltnd to
quantity Information, or to recordln*^ of percentat^e "doiTntlne" of
systems. Nowhere is accessibility and rellabllltv assessed In terms
of final consumer demand.
But an Initial attempt to assess benefits and costs will still
be made in the case of the Federal Po'rer rommission's ref^ular activities.
The costs of ret^jUlatlon can be estimated from Commission expenses, and
from a first limited survey of the defendant's actu-'l nxpendl turn's In
recent cases. The benefits are assessed from the Commission's cf.'m
public portrayal of Its accomplishments. VTliere^rpr the ^.P.C, shoi-;s
a dollar of benefits that can be classified undor "nrotf?c^^ on" or
"quality" of service, it may be questioned .-^d then redticed but not
denied. This procedure results In an optimistic f'stlmate of Commission
benefits minus costs on its on^oinf operations.
The Costs of Regulation hv the Federal Power ronT^isslony
The Federal Po<-fer Commission's powers to regulate the companies
producing or transnortinp. natural ?»as and electricitv are broad, j^l ven
the f3eneral wordinj» in its statutes, and the Federal Courts' willing-
ness to let all matters of price and qtiality pass before the Commission
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only «?o lonf as "Hue prnrfiss" in nhsf^rxTH. Hnt tho rf^nl ,•1^or^• nrores<?
for holding prices to "rosf-rs of aorvlro" Trnkp<5 \^^ t'T^ tailor oArt of
FeHpril Po'.'jer CoiT'iplssion activities o^ob voar. Tbr- rhronnlof^l r.il
steps In this process hfpin with nn fippll cJ^Hon for i rT-RTTFTCATF OF
NECFSSITY AND CONVFNTENCE by rho co^inw sepl<lnr to IntroHuro thp
rP^'jl^^^'^ prodvirt or service Into so^v? now market. Tb<' rprH ^1 r;'fo
.ippHcation Is eyanlnerl In bp.Tr"fn<»s for "snf fi rlonr"" of (lpn,TnH for
the propospd service and "capacltv" of the co^p/\v^' to provfHp the
service. This Is to asstire the nnall t" of servl cp, Aftpr certifi-
cation has been f»ranteH artd service has bofnn„ rbp revlevs of nrl ces
are undertaken first bv a bearings examiner, thpn tlip Connlsslon, and
finally on appeal by the Iln-lted f^tates Tonrts, Tlip ll'^-lt on averaj'R
prl cp is set close to the Commission's ostlnate of the c"sts of capital
and variable inputs needed to maintain the sp'-^Hrp demanded. Finally,
there are surveillance procednres for a^certa'tnln'' that tbp T>ri ce-profl t
ceilings f,o Into effect. All of tbpsp rovle^'s rP'^M^ re PXT-K^ndl tnres
on Commission, cotirt , and company personnel and "Jupporfinn. resonrces.
The expenditures of the Commission varied from "^11 to more
than $14 ml 111 on durinf? fiscal years lOfiA to 106«. Pa^t of this
o\itlay was for services having market valnp and not related to rej^vi-
lation» bcwevpr. Tn particular, some i/ere incirrpd in naoapiln*',
resotirces on Federal lands, Indian lands, or -fn nro^ndinf; maritime
navijiatlon within the jurisdiction of Federal "o"pr facilities. These
outlays alonf^ with those on survpll lance of the actlv'tles of other
Federal agencies In the hydroelectric power business, c^st ?;T.8 million

13
1
in thf fiscal ypqr 1168. The ref,tilntor<' mitl-'V''. tTT-Mrrpd h" the
Commission, or H*»hitP(1 to fi rm"? hy tho Comiiis'^i on , worr apprnxi n-at'* 1y
$10. fj "'illion in thp Inst rPcordeH fisrni year.
Thi«; amount was a small nart of tho ti-ita1 rn«!r«: fri tho
fconom" of a vpar's rPfulat'^r-^' nrorpp<1''nr»«; ^ hoijp""!-. •^o<5^ of thp
costs of rpj^nlqtion werp inrnrrpH hy thp nrodnoors of '?•»«: anH f»lor-
tricit" or hy thp transportation comnanies in thp'^o inHn'^friP'^ thr>t
werP HefpnHant^ in oasps or thp suhjert of "cost of <ipv^ri re"
rPvtewR, Tliere x^pre roii<»hlv <?iv rinssps of nrr.rppHinf's in a "par
TThi rh rp"nirP(i thp sprvirps of indnstr" ox^prtc, 1.T.»"Pr«5, and cot-
norat" oxpotitivps for extPaded periods of timp. Thp ro^t r\f thpse
reso\irr'?s varied from casp to rase, hnt «otimatPs ran he ronstrnrtpd
of a'<rpra"R rosts fo^ oaoh tvpp of prooppdin'\ vhi r'i nrn rpprespntatl vp
of most of the instances. In somo cases, actual c-'Sts f-tr all of that
typp ran be calculated. TliP total defendants' evT-endii-ur"'? perharx?
romp to more than $36 million in a reT>rpc!pntati ''r f^-!e;ra1 "oar. This
amount mif^ht seem much larper than experted, hnt a ratefor"-hv-
cateror}.' review sii5»p;eRts that it is not unreason ahle
,
The Costs of the Electric Po'/er Re'>ti1ator" Art^'intioc; of the fomm^ c:<;i on
After thirtv vpar<5 of leavint ref^nlation to tb'> "States, the
^ Cf. The Budget of the T'nit°d <^tates Cove mmont, 1^70^ Annnndix,
pafTO 9 30"!
""*' ' ~*
'
"

lA
Coirmii sslon ha<5 rnrripH out a carrpfllnn to r.nt '•'bo1rsf<1r> mll^n'' prlr^s
on nil -lales in Interstate connerce since a 1')f>4 Court (ipn'<5lon -<f-
ftrnlnf renii^^f^T .i'lrisfH oti on. The rptrhlnf-"" yror'^<~,'^ h^s
rentereH .ictivitlcs on reviewing exiRtln<; rri cf' srlie^'nlf"; , rather
than first certifying service and then reviexMn" prices. Annroyirr-atelv
2200 schedules have heen filed ench year, with supnort^n^ cost Infor-
mation. The Conmissionj on receipt of the ^^iHnf^s, has reviewed
virtually all of then. A nlnoritv are the snbiect of thp 50 "rate"
or price studies carried out each year, and also the basis for the
30 actual cases on "rates, terms, and conditions" brought before the
entire Commission an,^ appealed to thr» courts.
Each step of tills procedure is cost] v. The Federal PoT^7er
Commission Itself spent $l,6minion in fiscal year 19f^S on electric
power utilities ret^ulation (accordinT tn fhe Rudfet o^ the United
States Government). Discussions and correspondence vjith a number of
poller companies indicates that, even 1*^ the fllin," of schefiMlr>s in-
volves no new rate or costinr decisions, thev cost .^n^"^7here frorn
$25 to $1,000 of le<ral services and computer time to rronare. The
total costs of more than 2,000 filings bv the coTirinnies each "ear can
be conservatively estimated at $50,000.
The rate studies and cases initiated l>v the Federal Power
Commission are much more expensi-ire. The Conrission stnff initiates
the studies informally as part of anntial survpillance procedures,
when the first review of rate schedule and annual reports of costs
^ Cf. the U. S, Federal Power Commission 1964 Anntial 'Report
,
pp. 85 and 165,
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•sup.f'psrs that a ntorp completo /analysis ts W3rrantp<1, Their rpotie<5ts
for (letaileri capital expenrilttires and otitfut nntrpms arp so oytpn-
slve that some part of nomal eTnployee tln^e 1n thp ro™>anv ha," to bp
devoted to rhl«? refulatory work. With 31 rato studies in oroTress in
the 1968 fiscal year, most Involving new ral ml aM'ons of "ro«?r,s of
service", the total indirect costs of this staf«» of rec-nlation to the
companies r^ust have been extensive, A number o^ nm't>r romnanles
show "charges related to fllinps" of trore than Si,000 which are Incurred
1
while filling requests for information. This sta<»e in the annual
rej»ulatory review must cost the industrv $50,000 ner annuTn.
If the informal price review does not lead to the rpdnctions
soii<»ht by the Commission, then a formal rate rase is initiated. Annrox-
imately 30 cases are in process each year, and 10 of these are usual 1v
completed. Tn the three years a case is in process, a ftill "cost of
service" study js completed by both company and Commission, pre-hearln?^
conferences are held, hearinj^s are undertaken, and finall" a Commission
decision is rendered. All these steps involve investi pati ops and
testimony by company cost experts and executives, as v;e]l as the
services of accountants, economists, and la'-'vers A revieu of the
29 cases slioi^n in the 1968 Federal Po'jer Commission Annual Report
shows that the full company costs for proceedings "in docket" that
year ranged from $7,000 for a review of a single rate in Maryland to
$305,000 for a full scale rate review on service t^ a oroup of
cooperatives In l>Jorth Carolina. Most cases were decided in the
Cf. the Form 1 Annual Reports for Klectric Poorer Companies (1968)
under the accounts ^'rerulatory expense" (353) and •'consul t ants expense" (355)

1.6
defendants favor; for them, thpre are addltlonfll rri<;ts of dpi.iy ,^d
of (greater uncertainty an to future charpps and costs of f^nr'^irf.
Then the ID cases flntnhed in a year mist cost at least $1,')no,Onn
when all costs over the case lifetime are included. Tho tot-il costs
of reculatlnjT electricity wholesale prices probablv coto?'; to an
estimated $3.2 million per year, when both Commission and defendants
expenses are Included.
The nature of the cases themselves points to thn possible
occurrence of further indirect costs of re«»ulatlon. A larpe number
involve disputes between small cooperative connanles retailing elec-
tricity and larr;e p<T-;er-producln5 netx^orks; the noint of dispute is
the necessity for the wholesale price to be ef^ial to that charged some
2
other btiyer of the same or different size at p^f^mp other location.
These disptites do little more than demonstrate to the no^jer producers
that, In order to avoid hundreds of thousands of dollar*-, of litigation,
they must offer the small buyers prices reflert^nfr economies of scale
which do not exist for those buyers. This concJition must nrnvfde
Incentives not to connect to the small buyers — at the indirect costs
of higher generation expenses for locally-produced electricity.
The Federal Power Commission has embarked most tentatively
to add to the "quality" of service by initiating cases renuirinn;
the larger producers to provide power to small retailers. To this
This does not account for the possihl H tv of lo\.;er or hl^Jier costs
in any one year. If all cases were "sinjrle rate" cases, costs for de-
fense might be as low as $100,000; but if all vere complex statewide
rate reviev/s , then defense costs ml^ht be $3,000,000.
^ Cf. F-7129, t:-7183, E-7273, R-7308, F,-7344, K-7A?1, and F.7426 In
Table 10 of the 1968 Annual Report of the Federal Power Commission.
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point, tVie rnmpa"f<^ h^is had Uttle effect pxrpnt nn the. dpfens** costs
of regulation. The most promlslnj* docket was F,-7?57, In which the
city of Hainesville, Florida requested the F.P.C. to require Inter-
connection with Florida Power Corporation, snd the F.P.r, exsmlner
approved the reqtiest al.onf with a procedure for sharing the co<;r
savings in electricity .i»eneratlon. The Commission reversed the
examiner, and, In the fourth year of this proceeding, the city of
Calnesvllle's plea Is hefore the circuit court at "le" nrlcnns. The
costs of this and the fcX'J other "extension of ser-zlce" cases have
heen a little more than $100,000 apiece so fpr; If onl" rr-'n are
settled 1n a Commission workln«; year, then the cost-; por nnnttm of
this phase of regulation may he $700,000,
After prices have heen set Trlthln the framet'ork of regula-
tion, the day-to-day operations of electric comp.->n1es t-ike place
according; to rules set once apain hy the Commission. Cnnitrd enu1p-
ment used in operations has to ^e th,it sped f-?pd 1p "rosrc;" thst
determine rates. The Power Commission has heen "onrhictlnf field
examinations of those capital expenditures actual!" ^pAc. hv companies,
to ascertain that that they are the "original costs" for providing
the regulated services. More than 200 electric utilities filed
documentation on capital assets acttiallv in use; more than 350
companies filed studies of classification of orir-inal canltal expen-
ditures among types of service as well. These studies had v?'lue to
the f 1 m In their day-to-day operations so that not all of their
costs can be attributed to regtjlation — ^nr one, the companies
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learn where their equipment is. But the resources devoted to these
activities are clearly beyond those found in cost surveillance in
unregulated companies, and they have not been justified by the com-
panies as "cost effective" in terms of lost and found equipment.
The F.P.C. costs of "electric power industry systems evaluation"
were $1.3 million in fiscal year 1968. A small samjile of companies
shews that their costs on these activities cannot have been less
than $5,000 per annum in each company undertaking these procedures
1
in any one year. There have been approximately 40 documentation
and 75 classification reviews of present or proposed future facilities
actually completed in a fiscal year. A minimum estimate of the
resource costs of the F.P.C. 's electricity surveillance program
must be at least $1,9 million per annum, as a result.
An overall review of the repulation-related costs of the power
industry and Commission shows that approximately half are attributable
to price control activities and the other half to attempts to improve
the quality of service. The companies and Commission tof^ether seem
to have spent $3.2 million on rate or price rejy.ulation in a typical
year in the late 1960's, althouph variations in the costs of the
individual cases may have made this amount as high as $4.7 million or
as low as $1.8 million. They probably spend $3.4 million per annum
This is a sample average for thirty firms shCT^rinp, "regulatory ex-
pense" on Form 1 of the electric pcn'/er company reports to the Federal
Power Commission. These firms did not have underway other proceedings
mentioned above, or reported costs related to system reviews.
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on certificate and systems evaluations to extend the quality and
quantity of service. The total costs of these aspects of regulation
have been in the range from S5 m-i.llion to $8 million, and have been
close to $6.6 million.
The Costs of Gas Field Price Regulation
Regulation of prices charged by producers for natural gas
sold to Interstate pipelines has been in effect since the Supreme
Court decision of 1954 in Phillips Petrolerm Company v. Wisconsin
(347 U.S. 672). But there was not effective regulation, with
Commission-imposed limits on prices, during most of the 1960's.
The problem that delayed installation of price control was how
to set ceiling prices based on individual company records of "costs
of service", when gas comes from wells Jointly owned by a number of
producers each with different historical costs, or from different
wells in the same market but with histories of different exploration
and production expenditures. Faced with having to make arbitrary
cost allocations, the Commission moved away from prices based on
company "costs of service" to area price ceilings set in reference to
country-wide average costs of exploration and development. Provisional
prices were set for "new" and "old" gas field contracts in 24 areas in
1960. Formal Commission and Court proceedings have been underway in
review of the provisional prices. The Supreme Court in the Permian
Basin Area Rate Case (390 U.S. 747) affirmed the legality of this
price-setting method last year, so that price ceilings can now be set
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as a matter of course on historical average development costs over
large regions.
Regulation of prices is only the most important of a number
of Commission activities. The producing company with discovered and
developed gas reserves has to go through a number of formal proce-
dures beginning with obtaining a Certificate of Necessity to put the
gas into the pipeline soon after a sales contract has been signed.
The applications for Certificates now make up an inventory of approx-
imately 2,000 per annum, with 1,200 reviewed by the Commission in
the same year and most of the rest in the following year.
There have been t\^o opposing trends in administering Certificates
in the last decade. First, the reviews have become more detailed
over time, dealing with contract prices as well as security of
supply and demand in the assessment of "necessity and convenience,"
As a result, filings to the Commission now include a showing that
Initial prices on new deliveries are "in line" with those in the
field region, based on studies of contract pricing and other con-
ditions by lawyers and company accountants. But in contrast to this
extension, the Commission has devised a "temporary certificate"
allowing extremely rapid installation of new service while the full
certificate review is going on. The full Commission certificate
reviews take time and hold up the production process, since reserves
That is, since the certificate price can only be reviewed when
increased under the present interpretation of the Natural Gas Act,
this is the only point at which an initial review takes place.
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have to be secured and developed before certification, while produc-
tion can only take place after the review la complete. The new
"temporaries" reduce these costs of delay.
The balance of more complex permanent certificate reviews with
substitution of temporary certificates deteimlnes the costs of regu-
latory delay at the present time. In the early 1960's, the costs of
delay came to as much as C.17 per thousand cubic feet for every month
of delay, and were the reason for a 3.5 percent price premium attached
to regulated interstate sales over and above unregulated within-state
sales. The delay at that time was more than five months, and if
anything the delay at the present time is six months, given that
permanent certificates are processed more or less uniformly from one
2
to twelve months after application. But the present delay is
ameliorated by temporary certification, so that the price premium
As documented by R, W. Gerwlg, "Natural Gas Production: A Study of
the Costs of Regulation" The Journal of Law and Economics (October 1962)
pp. 86-88.
2
"
1The new gas certified each year has cost C = I c, q, [1 - ] more
'^ ^ (l+r)'l
as a result of regulatory delay, where c, is the present value of unit
costs of gas quantities q, in "n" individual contracts, and "r" is the
monthly percentage costs of delay during the delay period of length d .
Given other regulatory procedures, c. has to be not greater than initial
base prices set by the Commission for field areas; these prices average
close to 17 cents per thousand cubic feet, if it is assumed that contracts
were for reserves from new fields discovered in 196 7 and 1968. More than
60% of the new fields were in Texas, 10% in Louisiana, and the remaining
in other states; weighting the F.P.C. celling prices by these percentages
results in the $.17 average, q. is close to 16 trillion cubic feet, as
shown on page 48 of the F.P.C. Annual Report for the fiscal year 1968
(an amount that has a present value of 6 trillion cubic feet). With delay
costs "r" of one per cent per month for a "d" of six months, the certifi-
cation procedure could cost as much as $58 million per year.
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required by regulation cannot be half that in the early 1960's. At
the most, the temporary certificates could reduce the regulatory delay
to one month and the coets of delay to $10 million per annum; at the
least, temporaries are worthless because they do not dispel the un-
certainty of obtaining the final certificate and compound costs by
making possible delivery under a contract that will be rendered null
and void. In these worst circumstances, costs have to be those for
waiting for a permanent certificate and exceed $58 million for delay.
The step after certification in the Commission's regulation of
natural gas is to set producers' prices. As was mentioned, this has
been accomplished with maximum "area rates" on all gas in a large
geographical region. These rates are then compared with 6,000 rate
schedules each year to ascertain conformance to the rulings.
The Commission has used or required producers to use far more
resources in this pursuit of the ceiling price than might reasonably
be expected. The area rate proceedings have been massive and pro-
longed. The first case began in December 1960 with hearings on prices
set by 351 companies under 705 dockets for gas in the Permian Basin of
West Texas. Testimony and submissions were completed early in 1964
and were followed by a Commission decision in August 1965 setting a
maximum price of 16.5c per thousand cubic feet (m.c.f.) on "new"
gas-well gas and 14. 5c per m.c.f. on "old" gas. The Supreme Court
Cf. the preceding footnote for calculations for the worst case. The
most pessimistic estimate of all comes from assuming that the temporaries
have zero value - where the producer is indifferent between a temporary
and waiting for a permanent certificate. These costs are the costs of
waiting.
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affirmed this decision in May 1968 and the Commission then began
the last round of putting these ceilings in effect in place of the
"interim" or "in line" prices which held at 16c on new gas and lie
on old gas. The work on a single set of area rates has now almost
been completed.
Four more area rate cases have been initiated and are moving
along to the decision stage - albeit on a faster schedule, given
that the Permian Basin proceedings had provided the rulemaking and
even some of the documentation. The approach in each has been the
same, and has centered on finding long term historical average costs
of exploration, development, and production. This estimate is used
to set future ceiling prices, after adjustments are made for costs
of special conditions in the area. The search for these costs is
burdened with exceptional problems, Forem.ost of these is the lack
of economic analytical technique to find what is sought: the
separable costs of gas alone in the oil-gas regions, at both the
exploration and developmental stages. Without techniques to foreclose
discussions to the quality of data alone, testimony on method and on
opinions of those experienced In the industry becomes profuse. The
second problem has been to relate historical costs to future prices.
Both problems have multiplied the amount of testimony and greatly
prolonged cross-examination and rebuttal testimony.
The costs of the proceedings have been very extensive. The
Federal Fewer Commission's own expenses on gas regulation in the last
few years have included more than $3 million per annum incurred for
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staff devoted to preparing briefs and testimony on area rates as
well as for preparation of decisionSc The producers have under-
taken extremely thorough and expensi'.'e investigations of drilling
and production expenditures throughout the country. They have
retained more than 50 law fii-ms, more than a dozen economic and
engineering consulting companies to provide testimony before the
Commission. Their costs over all of these area proceedings have
never been calculated; but the examiner in the Permian Basin pro-
ceedings fotjnd that the total costs of producer regulation were
. I4c per m, c.f. , and uncontested industry testimony in the Texas
Gulf Coast Area Rate proceedings showed that these producer costs
come to .15c per m. c.f. The area reviews applied on approximately
75 per cent of the 16 trillion cubic feet of producer commitments
to the interstate pipelines in each of the last few years, so that
total producer expenditures on the area rate reviews must have been
2
close to $18 million.
Cf. Area Rate Proceeding , et. al. (Permian Basin) Docket number
AR 61-1, 34 FPC 159 (1965) at 197; and the testimony of S. F. Sherwln,
Exhibit number 42-J (SFS-1) , Schedule 17 in the Area Rate Proceedings
Docket numbers AR 64-1 and AR 64-2. These average fixed costs of
regulation Include the costs of certification and of rate schedule
review, as well as those in the area rate proceedings, so that they
are too large to be an estimate of the private expenses of the rate
proceedings alone. But they are not far out of line as a measure of
total costs of producer regulation because most rate schedule pro-
ceedings were suspended and replaced by the area rate reviews.
The producer commitments to interstate pipelines are given in the
Annual Reports of the Federal Pcwer Commission.
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Since area rates have not been set to apply on all interstate
gas sales, producing companies still file some individual rate
schedules for review. Also, a number of cases have been filed as
exceptions to the Commission-set maximum field prices, for reasons
having to do with exceptional production costs or with specific
terms of the sales contracts, or with conditions in state taxation
or regulation. These rases have not been dealt with rapidly,
presumably because of the priority assigned by the F.P.C. to setting
maximum area prices. Consequently^ only 500 suspended rate schedules
had been dealt with in fiscal year 1968 while more than 7,000 other
applications for rate increases remained in suspension that year.
The inventory of suspended rates has not only been large, but has also
involved more than $130 million of disputed payments; the costs of
uncertainty and delay for those finally receiving these amounts must
be substantial.
At the same time the individual rate revlex^s have continued to
develop into formal producer "rate cases", many involving the documen-
tation of production conditions outside of those setting area rates,
or involving company "costs of service" where there are no area rates.
Both involve finding "costs" for the individual production unit. The
arguments for a premium on prices to pay for more costs - say, in
more directional drilling for gas in deeper producing regions —
have been built on the most extensive statistical and accounting reviews.
The documentation Inflates the costs of making an individual "rate case"
presentation. In the few rate cases for which costs are available, it
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would appear that defending a rate schedule required expenditures
of $25,000; the 80 cases dealt with in a fiscal year result in total
defendants costs of $2 million at least.
The total costs of producer regulation are unknown, and can be
estimated only very imprecisely. The Commission itself spends $3.1
million per year on all aspects of producer regulation, and the com-
panies probably spend $20 million on defending rate cases — both
the large area rate cases and the smaller, more numerous case dis-
putes on suspended individual rate schedules^ The costs also incurred
by producers from regulating delay at the certification stage are more
difficult to estimate; the range given here is from $10 million to
$58 million, depending on the length of the delay. As a result, the
total regulation costs are from $33 million to $81 million.
The Costs of Gas Pipeline Regulation
The regulation of the long distance natural gas pipeline companies
resembles that of electric utilities much more than that of the gas
producing companies. The market structure in gas transportation and
electricity generation are similar. The interstate pipelines have
been built to such a scale that some have regional monopolies in
supplies to retail gas utility companies, while others face the
The source of the data has been private correspondence with a sig-
nificant number of defendants in the cases listed in fiscal year 1968,
The costs do not include those incurred in removing rate suspensions
in informal Commission proceedings; since more than 500 suspensicns are
reviewed each year, these total costs could be substantial — albeit
unknown at the present time.

27
possibility of substitute sales by no more than t\-io or three other
pipeline sources. With few companies in more or less separate
sub-national markets, and with each of these companies having some
of the characteristics of natural monopolies, the Commission has
proceeded with individual "cost of service" regulation.
The pipelines must first obtain Certificates of Necessity and
Convenience for rights-of-way to construct both their gathering lines
in the gas fields and dlstributlnR lines to retail gas companies.
The hearings and findings of the Coinmlsslon on these applications
are made to determine whether the demands of retail gas utilities are
sufficient to require full capacity operation of the proposed pipeline,
and if there are sufficient reserves under long-term field purchase
contracts to satisfy these demands. The Commission's quest for
quality In service has the effect, of course, of imposing costs on
the companies.
In order to prove "sufficiency", the pipeline presents a collec-
tion of field purchase contracts and wholesale sales contracts with
long lifetimes. It has long been suspected that the time-lengths of
these contracts have been longer than would be demanded by the pipe-
lines, in the absence of this certification procedure, since the
purpose has been to demonstrate full use of the proposed facility
for its lifetime rather than least-cost use over the normal decade-long
planning horizon in this uncertain Industry. The requirement for
twenty-year contracts reduces the risks of gas producers since their
sales are secured, and Increases the risks of pipeline and retailer
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not being able to complete final sales of the secured gas at com-
pensatory prices in the far future. The requirement reduces the
risks of final consumers of discontinued gas service. These risks
will be reflected in costs — higher costs for pipelines and re-
tailers in obtaining capital, and higher prices for the consumer
having to pay for these higher coats.
The clerical procedures for proving "sufficiency" are them-
selves expensive. The contract information is accompanied by
geological and legal studies establishing the ownership of gas
underground and not yet produced. These studies require the services
of experts and the final reported costs are attributed to the cer-
tification process. Part would be undertaken anyway, to establish
property rights for any gas sale, but the extent of documentation
here seems to be much greater. Again, these are costs Involved in
obtaining more complete knowledge of present and future delivery.
Certification of new facilities is completed while deliveries
are made on outstanding service contracts. There were more than 400
certificate applications before the Commission in 1968 involving
11,000 miles of proposed new line; some were major extensions of
more than 100 miles, but most were for a few miles of gathering line
into new fields and were not central to the transport of large
volumes of gas over 1,000 mile main lines. The central regulatory
concern of the transporters is with the prices to be charged for
mainline service.
Under the present ratemaklng procedures, the company proposes
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future price ceilings on a particular service based on new measures
of historical average costs of providing that service. The mea-
sures derive from recent expenditures as allocated between types of
service according to Commission rules -- the most important re-
quiring half of the capital costs to be allocated on the basis of
relative volume of gas purchased in the test year, and the other
half on the basis of relative volume purchased during peak load
1
periods. The data used in finding the measures, and the actual
calculations, are contested by the companies and Commission staff
in informal and case rate reviews. Estimates of the rate of return
required on pipeline investment by the markets for capital funds
depend on assumptions as to alternative uses of funds, and calcula-
tions of final "costs of service" depend on how closely the alloca-
tion formulas are followed. Both are points of dispute; numerous
financial and economic experts describe their judgments on the
procedure or estimate likely to reduce prices and increase quality
in the long run, leaving it to the examiner and Commission to judge
the correct values.
The Federal Power Commission in recent years has exercised its
judgment in a large number of informal rate filing actions as well as
formal case reviews of pipeline rates. The natural gas pipeline
The so-called "Atlantic Seaboard formula" as given in Atlantic Sea-
board Corp. et. al. A3 PUR (NS) 235 (1952). The costs assigned to
service j are Ci =- VCj + '^/2 (Qj /q^+q .) + '^/2(Qj t/Qit+Qj t) where VC^
are total variable costs actually incurred in j, Q's are volumes consumed
by j and other i demanders throughout the year and also at peak load
period t.
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companies file close to 1500 rate schedules each year, and those
dozen or so calling for rate increases are either allowed or sus-
pended by the Cotmnlssion almost immediately. The suspended rates
are either withdrawn or become central issues in the 30 formal rate
cases pending each year before the Commission, along with rate de-
creases called for by F.P.C. staff investigators. When cases are
completed, the F.P.C. staff then carries out compliance reviews to
ascertain that reductions "flow through" to final consumers of gas.
Altogether, these activities cost the Federal Power Commission
1
close to $3.5 million per annum. The sum total of the private costs
of regulation for the gas pipelines was $2.5 million in the last
recorded year. Both changes in Commission procedures and in lawyers'
and economists' charges can change the total; also, a slight change
in the mix towards more complex cases in the range of filings made in
a year could revise it upwards by a large amount. But these are not
likely events, given that the Commission has worked out highly formal
procedures for finding costs and that it entertains differences of
views only in narrow topics of cost allocation, tax payments, or in
rate of return levels. The 1968 cases were quite orthodox, and they
cost the defendants about what can be expected.
^ The Federal expenditures for natural gas pipeline regulation are
shown as $3,526 million in fiscal year 1968. Cf. The Budget of the
United States Government, 1970 , Appendix, page 9 30.
Compiled from "regulatory expanse" and consultants' charges
shown by each of the interstate pipeline companies in the Federal
Power Commission Form 2 Reports for 1968.

31
There are substantial costs in each of the Federal Power
Commission's procedures. A first, but indicative, review of
available information on expenditures of both regulator and regu-
lated is shown in Table 1. The costs of government activities are
roughly matched by those of private companies in all activities
except gas field price regulation, where private expenditures are
ten times greater. The costs can vary greatly from those shown;
in particular, the range of likely private expenditures is from
$35 to $85 million per year. But further analysis is most probably
going to find F.P.C. costs slightly lower and private costs slightly
greater than shown. The expenditures of all concerned are close to
$37 million on Federal Power Commission regulation in a single year.
The minimum field price costs of $30 million Include $10 million
resulting from certification delay (assuming that the delay has been
cut to a minimum of very few months) , $18 million from area rate pro-
ceedings, and $2 million in other rate reviews and cases.
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Table 1: The Annual Costs of Regulation
Activity Federal Power
Comrrdsa lor. Co? ts_
estimate
(itiilllons of $)
Company Costs
estimate range
(millions of $
:tric power price regulation
itric power systems evaluation
field price regulation
pipeline price and systems
regulation
jral Commission administration
1.6
1.3
3.1
3.5
1.1
1.6
1.9
30.0
2.5
0.2 to
30.0 to
al Annual Costs 10.6 36.0 34.6 to
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The Benefits from Regulation by the Federal Power Commlsaion
The standards for setting maximum prices have been rather
general, given the mandates of Congress and the courts, and those
for regulating quality have been ad hoc by nature. Changes in em-
phasis on portions of statutory language can lead to significant
changes in regulatory procedures and reviews. Given such discretion,
what has been the behavior of the Commission? With a well-established
organization and peremptory power to demand resources, what has been
decided by the Commissioners, and what have been the effects of the
decisions on the economy in general?
The Commission itself attempts to show the economic effects of
regulation in the Federal Power Commission Annual Report . The 1968
Report announced that during the last fiscal year "reductions in
wholesale rates of electric power moving in interstate commerce and
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction amounted to $8,860,595;
the largest total for a single year in the Commission's history. . . .
While many rate filings were submitted by the utilities on their own
initiative, nearly 70 per cent of the total dollars of rate decreases
were the result of Commission action. . ." (The Federal Power Commission
Annual Report, 1968
,
page 19), The cases against proposed price in-
creases included some decided in the Commission's favor, or withdrawn
by the companies. The dollar amounts that would have been paid by the
consumers in the absence of these cases are counted among the gains
from power regulation.
There were much greater gains claimed from imposing ceiling
prices on field supplies of natural gas. The interim ceiling prices
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set in 1961 were lower than the unregulated prices on sales of new
reserves in 1960. The resulting total "savings" in purchase costs
of pipeline buyers were consumer benefits attributed to regulation.
The Commission's assessment of the benefits was given in the 1964
1
Annual Report as $434 million, the amount collected by the producing
2
companies subject to refund after the regulatory review was complete.
The Federal Power Commission also saw benefits from reduced gas
consumer prices as a result of gas pipeline rate investigations. The
Commission states that, "Of ten major proposals to increase [pipeline]
rates by a total of $63,380,200 annually. . , One proposal, involving
$2,687,100 annually was rejected and two involving $95,400 annually
were accepted without suspension.
.
." (The Federal Power Commission
Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1968
,
page 59). Another $13 million of
rate increases X7ere withdrawn by the companies in the face of Commission
opposition, and there were $13,9 million in rate reductions required
of the pipelines after Federal Power Commission rate filing reviews.
The Commission actions in the gas pipeline industry resulted in $28
million of rate reductions which were eventually to become benefits to
the individual consumers of natural gas.
This accounting results in greater estimated benefits to the
economy than economic analysis allows. The rate reductions are realized
Cf. the Federal Power Commission Annual Report (1964)
,
page 140.
2
The Commission did not state directly that the receipts subject to
refund were consumer benefits. Two implicit statements are needed to
make the argument: (1) these receipts (AP)Q for volumes Q at price
reduction AP are benefits to pipelines (2) the pipelines pass them
on to the consumer in full.
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by some consumers as increases of real income, but other consumers
in their roles as stockholders of gas and electricity companies
experience income losses from dividend reductions. The Income pains
of the first group and the losses of the second, shewn as the area
"A" equal to (Pi-P,)Q, in Figure 1, result in only partial net
economy-wide gains. The net gains depend entirely on the extent to
which the income distribution after the rate reduction is more "so-
1
cially acceptable" than the distribution before the reduction.
Only the "quantity-quality" increases generated bv regulation are
net economy-wide plains. The consumption (generated by the reduction
in price can result in net gains to both groups, given that the area
"B" under the demand function is not an income loss of the producers
2
and is a gain of the consumers. The consumption generated by In-
creased demands under regulation, shewn as area "C", also result in
net gains for the economy. But neither areas "B" and "C" can be said
to be a large part of the Federal Power Commission's dollar savings
from regulation.
There is no a priori reason to favor the consumer's income over
that of stockholders, because there is no theory establishing the
general equity of such redistribution. In fact, there is no theory
implying that such redistribution makes income more equal; rather
this is an empirical matter,
2
There are technical assumptions required to make this statement
hold, which imply that the effects can be described by movements
along this demand curve and not from shifts of this curve, Cf,
M. Friedman, the "Marshallian Demand Curve", Journal of Political
Economy , December 1949. But also the area "B ' has to be net of
costs of supplying the additional consumption, even though the
"costs of service" do not show whether this is the case.
U-
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Not only economic analysis but also conditions in f»as and
electricity markets may not allot-; so tolerant an interpretation of
the results from regulation. Price reductions might have taken
place in the absence of regulation as a result of cost reductions.
After all, monopolists are expected to reduce prices when scale
effects are predominant, or factor costs decline as a result of
technical progress, or when there is substantial entry of other
companies on geographical or product frlnf»es of markets lonp held
on an exclusive basis. All these conditions have been present in
these two industries. There is evidence of larpe scale economies
in systems, and of substantial recent cost reductions from fuol price
reductions in electricity. Companies in each industry face compe-
tition from those in the other and from coal and oil in industrial
markets for energy. The company may be more than willing to reduce
rates for reasons of profit and credit the results to vigorous regu-
lation by the Commission,
Economic Benefits from Electric Power Regulation
The Federal Power Commission announced $8.9 million of electricity
price reductions in the 1967-1968 fiscal year, but claimed tliat only
70 per cent of this amount resulted from Commission initiatives, so
"' Cf. P. MacAvoy and J. Sloss, Regulation of Transport Innovation:
Unit Trainloads of Coal to the Eastern Seaboard (Random House, 1966)
and P. MacAvoy, Economic Strategy for Developing Nuclear Breeder
Reactors, Appendices A and C (M.I.T. Press, 1969).
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that the benefits from regulation were $6,2 million in that year.
This is a first and potentially interesting indication of the size
of the price reduction on all established sales (equal to area "A"
in Figure 1). But an additional step has to be talcen to make it
useful for assessing economy-wide gains. These gains of consumers
have to be measured against the losses of other consumers receiving
income from the electricity generating companies.
The calculation proceeds by groups of consumers. The purchasers
of electricity that are Industrial or commercial enterprises exper-
iencing price reductions surely gain no more than the electricity
producers lose. Price reductions are passed on in dividends or
lower final product prices. The recipient companies' stockholders
gain the dividends that the electricity company stockholders lose so
that there is no net gain, unless there is some particular condition
such as the recipients being "poorer" than the electricity company
equity holders. The final consumers of products from companies with
lower electricity costs of course could capture all the benefits. But
this has not been very likely — the four largest gas and electricity
consuming industries in the 1960's were so highly concentrated that
individual recipient companies certainly need not have passed on
small cost reductions in order to survive. It cannot be assumed that
According to the 1962 Census of Manufacturers , the four largest con-
suming industries were primary metals, chemicals, petroleum, and stone-
clay-glass. The four digit concentration ratios in these industries
were 56.1, 49.3, 36,7, 37,1 per cent respectively, according to Concen-
tration Ratios in Manufacturing Industry (Washington, 196 3); they are
all higher than the all-industries average of 32 per cent.
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an appreciable proportion of the $6,2 million accrues to final con-
sumers through producing companies experiencing lower energy costs;
it is expected here in practice that there is no net gain from
1
income transfer on 55 per cent of the dollar rate reductions.
The final consumers of electricity in contrast may Rain some
part of the amount that the owners of the electrical companies lose.
There are many different opinions on hew much a dollar is worth when
given to person X, after it has been taken from person Y, Here the
point of view is that the government should decide, and it indicates
value by the amount that consumer X can keep after taxes (the re-
maining portion of the dollar beinp, taken in taxes for better political
use elsewhere).
The governments of this country tax consumers on income received
in money wages and salaries, but not income received in price reduc-
tions on consumption goods. It would appear that the rate of political
preference for price reductions is very high, and any amount passed
directly from producer to consumer should be treated as completely
gained. The preference for dividend increases, as revealed by tax
treatment of these incomes, is very low; dividends are taxed at the
2
corporate rate of 50 per cent before they are distributed, and then a
In a typical year in the late 1960's, commercial and industrial sales
accounted for 55 per cent of total revenues from ultimate or final
service each year. Cf. F.P.C. Statistics of F:iectric Utilities .
2
Only so long as companies cannot take advantage of exceptions
such as depletion or depreciation allowances. These exceptions
of course reduce the real rate below the formal 50 per cent rate.
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second time at the applicable personal income tax rate. It would
appear that only the income left after double taxation is lost bv
a rate reduction.
As a result, reducing dividend incomes of electricity company
stockholders by $1.00 transfers [.50 (1-t) ] ($1.00) of "political Iv
1
approved" income to consumers. With an average tax rate "t" on
2
dividend receivers' own personal Incomes equal to 40 per cent, the
transfer to consumers results in gains of 3nc on the dollar. Tlie
other 70c on the dollar is received by the consumer, but it comes
from taxes foregone and the electricity consumer has no special
claim on that over recipients in povemment programs. The amended
estimate of net gains on direct consumer sales in the $6.2 million
3
is $0.8 million.
The economic gains are associated, however, with the quantity
increases generated by the rate reductions (shown as area "B" in
Figure 1). The maximum estimate of this surplus is the area (AP«AQ)/2
for the regulation-induced price reduction Ar and the resulting in-
crease AQ in quantity demanded. The Commission reports do not
That is, the direct transfer from net income of dividend receiver to
net income of rate payer is $].00 minus taxes, or
($1.00) - [(1.00). 50 - (1.00)(.50)t] = .50(l-t)(1.00).
The average income of all stockholders is estimated to be $108,000
per year. This estimate is from weighting incomes shewn in 1967 Statis-
tics of Income (Individual Returns) by the amount of dividends received.
Cf. U.S. Department of the Treasury Statistics of Income 1967. The average
aggregate tax rate on this Income, given personal deductions allowed in
a four person family, cannot exceed 40 per cent. Then the implied rate
of taxation on $1.00 of pre-tax dividend income of an electric generating
company is 50 per cent on corporate tax and 20 per cent on personal tax
(or 40 per cent on the remaining after-cornorate-tax 50 per cent).
This is 30 per cent of the 45 per cent of total sales accounted for
by home consumers.
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estimate the rate reductions, nor their effects on quantity demanded.
They can be roufihly approximated in percentage terms.
The Commission tells us that rate reductions in the two most
important cases were 5 per cent and 9 per cent of total receipts, so
that the average of (AP)(Q)/(PQ) can be assumed to be 7 per cent.
Other sources provide indications of demand elasticity PAQ/QAP.
Demand elasticity estimates in detailed econometric studies range
from -.2 in the high income Northeast states to -.7 in the Southern
states for home consumption. Industrial demand studies indipate
1
elasticities of -1.0 in ten large using industries. A less exact
2
but more current overall estimate of elasticity is -1,2. The two
together can be used to find area "B". Multiplying this last elasticity
estimate by the percentage reduction provides an estimate of AQ ; this
along with the Commission's announced reductions of $6.2 millicxi pro-
3
vldes an estimate of (AP) (AQ) /2 of $260,000. The quantity-increase
F. M. Fisher and C, Kaysen, A Study in Econometrics; the Demand
for Electricity in the United s'tates (North Holland, 1962), pp. 42,
50, 135, These are averapes over states and industries, roughly in
accordance with the amount of electricity consumed,
2
P. W. HacAvoy, Economic Strategy for Developing Nuclear Breeder
Reactors (M.I,T. Press, 1969), Appendix C, "Documentation of Fore-
casts , The elasticity is for price of electricity effects on the
demand for generating capacity, and this is a long run elasticity.
The calculation procedure is straightforward. There are three
pieces of information: (a), (AP)(Q)= -(6.2) (10^); (b) , (AP)Q/PQ= -.07;
and (c) , PAQ = -1.2QAP assuming that the elasticity of final demand
is -1.2. From (b) and (c) , -PAQ/PQ - -.084 or Q = AO/.084. Substi-
tuting this expression for Q in (a), then (AP) (AQ) = -(6.2) (10°) (.084)
and 1/2 of this amount constitutes a first estimate of consumers'
Surplus.

41
benefits from one year's electricity regulation are not miicli more
than one quarter million dollars.
The total annual benefits In "A" and "B" should last at least
five years, and it may well be ten years before chanj?es in market
structure and demand conditions vitiate the one year's particular
events in regulatory history. Accounting for this lag effect, the
total benefits from the surveillance and rate review activities
during a single year are equal at most to the nresent value of ten
years of price reduction. An example is shown in Figure 2: at time
t , a review of rates has been completed and has resulted in prices
being reduced from P to P ; both P and P fall after that time as
1 2 12
a result of greater than economy-wide productivity increases, but P
falls slo^^er than P until at time t much of the effect of the
1 1
rate review has been eroded; at that time a nev; review takes place.
Figure 2
Price
t^ t time

A2
The example raises the central questions on how rapidly the two price
lines merge, and when the next review takes place. The answers can
only be surmised at this stage of our knowledge of F.P.C. activities;
a conservative response — making for a maximum estimate of benefits —
is that it takes ten years for all effects of a review to be realized,
1
but the effects decline at the rate of 15 per cent per year. The
present value of income benefits of type "A" is $'i.O million, and of
quantity type "B" is $1.3 million.
These amounts must be maximum net benefits. The price reductions
required after any one Commission review are usually small, and the
costs of litigation not so small, so that the temptation of the com-
pany is to concede the Commission-ordered reduction even when it takes
some rates below costs.
This is seen in the most recent formal case review of an elec-
tric power company's rate schedule before the Commission: the Northern
States Power Company (in Docket E-7140) conceded $254,468 of rate
reductions based on 1963 schedules after an extensive cost analysis
by the company sho^jed "cost of service" of $4,653 million and a paral-
lel analysis by the Commission staff showed "costs" of $3,486 million.
There were no standards by which the difference could be resolved,
since they "reflect differences in cost assignment and allocation
procedures" (34 FPC 883, at 884). V71thout substantive procedures, the
The fifteen per cent discount rate is somewhat high, but delib-
erately so. There are two reasons: this is a realistic estimate
of the rate of return in the private sector on resources drawn off
for the regulatory process, and this accounts for the possibility
of very high rates of decay in the gap between P and P2 when the
economy changes rapidly.
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company could only assess its chances of winning in Court in a
random process but after extensive additional costs of litigation.
It chose to concede "without preiudice to its contentions" and
the Federal Power Commission found this "an acceptable compromise
of contested issues involving numerous judgmental factors" (Ibid.).
The company's choice was between the costs of litigation, or revenue
losses in price reduction, whichever was less, but without regard to
whether the second resulted in rates below production costs. The
clear possibilitv exists that these reductions took rates below
production costs, with consequent loss of some part of the quantity
gains in area "B",
There are two more reasons why this is a maximum estimate of
the gains from electricity rate regulation. First, some part of
the "Commission-induced" reductions would have occurred anyway.
One company president said, in response to requests for estimates of
the private costs of regulation, "in the early 1960's the Federal
Power Commission for the first time asserted jurisdiction over the
sales by electric utility companies to local distribution systems. . . .
Although the Commission's jurisdiction had been defined by statute
in 1935, the Commission under Chairmen Swidler and White greatly
extended the concept of what constituted an interstate sale. In most
states these wholesale rates had been regulated by the state commissions
for many years. ... Many state commissions still assert duplicate
jurisdiction over such sales.
. .
." With duplicate regulation,
some rate reductions occur as a result of the activities of state
commissions.

4A
Last of all, quite plausible conditions in electricitv markets
implying lower benefits could hold rather than those assumed above,
Tlie percentage price reduction, and the elasticity of con55uiners'
demand with respect to that reduction, could well have been much
lower than the estimates used here. In fact, price reductions be-
low five per cent, with a value of elasticity of -.2 (as found by
Kaysen and Fisher for home consumers in high income states) make the
estimated consunters' surplus "B" from regulation so close to zero
that it might as well not be considered at all. A more cautious
view of benefits restricts the estimated amount to that for area "A",
for a five year period before the "decay" of the difference between
regulated and unregulated prices, and this amounts to only $2.7
million from one year's regulation.
Economic Benefits from Gas Field Price Regulation
The Federal Power Commission's setting of interim natural gas
field prices was not enough of an "act of regulation" by itself to
show economic benefits. Since these interim prices are still being
reviewed in the "area rate" proceedings, regulatory effects have not
yet been realized. But timing alone is not the only reason for lack
of results; in fact, regulatory gains are not going to be realized
in any straightforward manner whenever the "area rates" are determined.
The effects of area rates include hard-to-detect gains by some con-
sumers and losses by other consumers as well as producers.
The proposed area rates freeze prices at the level attained on
the larger "packages" of field reserves in the late 1950 's to very
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early I960's. Those prices "cleared the market" plven the demand
and supply conditions of that time. Since then market conditions
have not been the same — population and income Increases, changes
in tastes in favor of cleaner fuels, have increased demands by sub-
stantial magnitudes. The question is whether there has been
additional supply forthcoming to satisfy the greater demands for
new contract reserves. Under normal conditions of gas discovery,
with effective competition in field markets, the imposition of 1960
price ceilings could only guarantee that the quantity supplied would
reflect 1960 conditions. Then 1970 (increased) demand and 1960 supply
would imply excess demand. But gas discovery and development varies
greatly from year to year without close and direct relation to prices,
so that supply could have increased more or less than normal.
Excess demand where it occurs results in reduced benefits to
consumers having to do without some part of the service they seek at
the going prices. The lower regulated prices provide gains for those
established consumers not affected by service restriction. But the
lower prices also reduce incomes of those receiving dividends from
the gas producing companies. The gains have to be compared with the
losses.
These gains and losses are illustrated in Figure 3, for a regional
market containing new reserves of gas for sale under long term contract
The effectiveness of competition here is one of the most researched
topics in industrial economics in the last few years; there is tacit
agreement even in the area rate cases to center analytical attention on
the competitive model. Cf. review and citations in E. Kitch, "Regulation
of the Field Market for Natural Gas", The Journal of Law and Economics ,
October, 1969.
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to pipelines. The demand for reserves of Ras to serve new industrial
and home consumers is shown as the curve D, with additional reserves
sought by pipelines at lower prices per thousand cubic feet. The
supply of these reserves — found in exploration for f,as and oil,
and developed by additional drilling beyond the exploratory well —
is shown by the curve marked SS. The market clears at price P cents
per thousand cubic feet of newly contracted reserves and qu.-mtity Q
trillion cubic feet of new reserves sold to pipelines per annum.
The Commission, however, sets area rates that average only P' so that
the quantity demanded is Q" while the quantity supplied is Q'. The
demand curve I)' shows the amounts sought only for those not rationed.
With these restricted demands, the smallest possible loss to excluded
*
1
consumers is the shaded area B in the diagram, since this is the
graphical representation of the net amount over costs that the (un-
satisfied) consumers would pay to receive the "lost" output Q - 0',
The greatest possible loss is the whole area bef<7een the two curves
D and D' above the supply curve; this would occur if rational con-
sumers are excluded outright and all of the demands of other consumers
2
are met. Either of the loss estimates have to be balanced against
Area B* is not equal to area B in Figure 1, because it includes both
triangles above and below the price line P. The triangle below the
price line, equal to producer's surplus, was excluded in the first
diagram. This was not for analytical reasons but because there is no
measure at this point in research for the difference bet^^7een marginal
costs (in that case) and "costs of service" (equal to average price in
that case). At the least, the companies have not announced their gains
from the quantity or sales increases initiated by regulation (if any).
2
This is the case in which pipeline extensions to certain locations are
simply not allowed because "reserves are insufficient".
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Figure 3
Price
P'
Gas reserves
the potential gains to those receiving all they want. These pains are
that "politically acceptable" part of the income transfer shot-m as area
A; they are only part because some of the transfer is to other indus-
tries besides the gas producinj; industry, and some is forej^one tax
payments given to consumers with "socially-less-desirable" incomes.
We shall attempt to estimate the losses from excess demand and this
income gain as well.
The losses of unsatisfied gas consumers in recent vears have
not been directly observable. Even if thev were great, the losers
themselves have not been aware of their circumstances because the
pipelines have been providing them gas that they will not be able to
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provide in the future. Faced with new contract volumes less than the
amounts necessary to make deliveries to new customers over the next
twenty years, the pipelines provide gas to all new sources of demand
for a shorter time period. The losses to customers are from the
shortened commitment — from gas not available to continue delivery
in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth years. Most of them do
not react to these losses when delivery begins; but they can still be
detected indirectly in the supply-demand behavior of the p;a.s field
markets.
Here the losses are assessed by first finding (1) the magnitude
of excess demand (Q" - Q'), then estimating (2) the area under the
demand function D between Q' and Q" , and last subtracting out (3)
the area under the supply curve SS between Q' and Q". This procedure
leaves the shaded area B in Figure 3 as a residual. So as not to
exaggerate the losses, this residual is made as small as seems
re as on ab le
.
(1) Excess demand (Q" - Q') depends on the amount of new reserves
needed to meet commitments to new buyers and on the amount needed to
replace depleted reserves for established buyers. The Federal Pox^er
Commission considers reserve demand of pipelines to be twenty times
the voluiae of initial delivery to a final buyer; that is, demands for
reserves are based on "the assumption that each new market commitment
is backed by a twenty year supply." To make this commitment on new
sales to industrial and retail utility consumers, new reserves should
be purchased by the pipelines equal to twenty times the amount of any
Federal Power Commission, A Staff Report on National Gas Supply and
Demand (Bureau of Natural Gas, Washington, D.C. , September 1969) p. 18.
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additional delivery to final consumers; this "commitment to expanded
delivery" is derived as demand D(l) in column (3) of Table 2 by
multiplyinp year-to-year production changes by twenty. To maintain
commitments to established buyers, the same rule woulcl apply on re-
placement reserves. Each year, approximately 5 per cent of deliveries
into pipelines deplete old reserve commitments of the Ras producers,
and the continuation of service to final consumers requires this
replacement with new commitments of 20 year reserves with the same
annual rate of production. Demand D(2) for commitments to these
final consumers equal 5 per cent of "base year" (1962) deliveries
times twenty, or are equal to the actual levels of delivery in that
1
year. These demands are shown in column (A) of Table 2. The two
demands together have been for more reserves than those likely to
have been supplied from newly developed j»as acreage bv an amount of
2
13 trillion cubic feet per year in the period 1962-1967.
This amount can be called "excess demand" only if two conditions
hold. First, there should have been no excess holding of reserves from
earlier years, to be put against the deficit in the 1962-1967 period.
Second, there should have been continued demands of established buyers
for the gas listed in "replacement reserves" even when there were
substantial price increases. The first would seem to have been the
If production on old contracts equals X, an amount that is 5 per
cent of committed reserves R in every case, then new reserves to
maintain the rule-of-thumb should be AR » .05R = X,
2
The average difference between (a) reserves in column (2) and
(b) "commitments" in column (3) plus column (A), was 12.7 trillion
cubic feet per year.

50
T ab le 2 : Kstlmates of Supply and Demand
for Reserves in the United States
Supply Demand
D(l) D(2)
Reserves Required for Reserves Required to
Additional Production Replace Depleted 1962
(trillions of cubic Reserves (trillions
feet) of cubic feet)
(3) (4)
18.2 13.6
16.0 13.6
18.2 13.6
25.8 13.6
17.8 13.6
19.9 13.6
Year
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Che case; prices were generally increasing in the five years previous,
and there were deficits in reserves in each of these years averaging
2
to 4.0 trillion cubic feet per annum. But the second condition may
not have been realized. The price increases experienced in the 1950-
1960 period should have been sufficient to induce many of the gas users
in the primary metals industries to switch to residual fuels when
long-term contracts under the old prices expired; indeed, the volume
of use of gas in that industry declined from 3.8 trillion cubic feet
3
in 1954 to 0.9 trillion cubic feet in 1962. This was extra marRinal
replacement, and there were other industrial buyers in disadvantageous
locations or with loi^-priced alternative fuel suppliers who were in
4
the same category. If most of replacement demand actually did disap-
pear at prices close to the F.P.C. 's ceiling prices, then there was no
excess demand. As one alternative plausible state of the industry,
it is assumed here that most of the replacement demand shown in Table 2
existed and thus that excess demand has been 13 trillion cubic feet
per annum. As another alternative, less plausible state of this industry,
it is assumed that there was very little replacement demand and thus
that there was no excess demand.
Cf. P. MacAvoy Price Formation in Natural Gas Fields (Yale University
Press, 1962) Chapters 5,6,7.
The 1955-1961 total deficit of "additions to reserves" under "demand
for reserves" is estimated as 28.1 trillion cubic feet as calculated from
American Gas Association statistics as noted in Table 2.
^ Cf. the Census of Manufacturers , op . cit .
In fact, the all-industries consumption of natural gas shown in the
Census of Manufacturers declined from 5.9 trillion cu. ft. in 1954 to 4.3
trillion cu. ft. in 1962. This partial census alone implies that
(1.6 trillion) (20) = 32 trillion cu. ft. of demand in that period was eliml
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(2) The area under the demand function over the range of
excess demand can be approximated if estimates are available of the
amount of excess demand (13 trillion cubic feet to zero trillion
cubic feet), and the amount of "cleared" demand (approximately 19
trillion cubic feet of new reserves on averaj^e as shrnTO In column (2)
of Table 2). Also, there has to be an estimate of the elasticity of
1
demand for additional reserves. In fact, there are many demand
studies of final users of pas, the most complete and analytically
2
convincing being those of Pietro Balestra. His studies of incremen-
tal demands of home consumers provide an indication of the demands
for new reserves to be used to provide more home consumntlon; they
3
show a price elasticity of -1.3 in the last year of the study (1962).
Demands of industrial users, accounting for almost 65 per cent of the
4
total volume of production at the present time, hnve not been analyzed
in a dynamic model; but studies of industrial buyers at different
locations with varyin,"? gas prices show price elasticities in con-
5
sumption exceeding, -2.7. The weighted average of home and industrial
The area under the demand curve between Q' and 0", and above the
existing regulated price P' , is approximated bv APAO/2. Here AQ => Q" - Q'
and AP = P'AQ/Qe^ with ej) equal to the elasticity of demand for new re-
serves. Then APAQ/2 =« PMAQ)^/2Q"e .
2
P. Balestra The Demand for National Has In the United States
,
Amsterdam,
the North Holland Publishing Company (1967).
3
op. cit.
,
section 4. 3. 7.
, pp. 95-99.
4
Cf. The Federal Power Commission Annual Report 1968, p. 45.
Cf. the Federal Power Commission's econometric model, as in Testimony
of J. Harvey Edmonston
, Federal Pother Commission Docket AR6 1-2 , South
Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding". The model contained In this testimony has
been severely criticized because of feedback from demand to supply that
always "clears the market" at the demand-determined price. But the indus-
trial demand sub-system has not been open to such criticism; indeed, it is
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1
elasticities is close to -2.2. Given this estimate, the pross loss
of consumers' surplus ArAQ/2 from excess demand is estimated at
2 2
APAQ/2 = P'(AQ) /2Q"e - $204 million.
(3) The net loss is equal to this gross loss on sales to con-
sumers not receiving service, minus the costs that would have been
incurred on the additional service. These costs are shown as the area
under the supply curve over the same range of excess demand of 13
trillion cubic feet. To make calculations of this area, all that are
needed, in addition to the estimates above, are the elastlcitv of the
supplv function e and the market clearing quantity Q at the unrepu-
s
lated price. To find the elasticity of supnly, we turn again to the
F.P.C. econometric model of gas prices. There we find that reserves
{ R = 3.5 + .257Y.f} where Y is the number of discovery wells and f is
footage drilled; removing the defective feedback from production (de-
mand) to reserves (supply) in Y results in a direct orice-suoply
3 4
relationship with an elasticity close to ->-.2 39.
1 I
The weighted average follows from assuming that household and com-
mercial demand both have the same elasticity and comprise 35% of the
total new demand for reserves. The industrial demand includes electric
pcMBT and gas transmission demand and comprises 65% of total consumption.
Consumption and reserve demand are assumed to be the same in all cases -
an assumption that holds only if there is no decline In industrial con-
sumption with rising prices, as above. Cf. the F.P.C. Annual Report , on .
cit
.
, p. 45.
2
Here P' the unregulated price Is 17 cents per m, c.f., AQ or excess
demand is 13 trillion cubic feet, Q" the total of realized and excess
demand is 32 trillion cubic feet, and e is -2.2.
Cf. the testimony of P.H. Cootner in rebuttal of .1. Harvey Edmonston,
Docket A1161-2, "South Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding". Professor Cootner
recalculates the equation after removing this feedback condition, and
the recalculation is used here,
4 3
In shortened form Y = oP'^
,
where a stands for a series of variables
unrelated to price, and R = 3.5 + .257 (aP^'^).f. Tlien e = P^R/RSP =
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The market clearing quantity Q can be found indirectly. The
chanpe in price P to brinp forth supply is equal to the chanpe in
price required to reduce demand to the market clearing level, so
that AP/P = (Q-Q')/Q' . 1/e = -(Q"_n)/0" . 1/e . This equation can
s D
be solved for Q. For the indicators available here, the estimated
market clearing quantity Q is close to 20 trillion cubic feet in a
"typical" year in the late I960's — an amount very close to the
19 trillion cubic feet found on average under re«>ulation.
All the estimates have been made that are required to measure
the "shaded area" of losses to unsatisfied consumers In Figure 3. The
area under the supply curve is approximately $18 million, a small
amount reflecting the low elasticity of demand; the area of excess
demand below price P is $174 million, reflecting the hiph elasticity
2
of demand. The losses to consumers from excess demand are $204-192
million or $12 million per year. This is the p,reatest likely dollar
equivalent to the shaded area in ^-igure 3. The smallest likelv loss
is zero, as a result of approximate equality of Q' , Q and O" from
regulated prices clearing the market at the approximate unregulated
level.
* This area is found bv solving APAQ/2 = P ' (O'-Q) /20'e with the
values in the text.
2
This area is equal to APAQ/2 « P'(Q"-n) /20"e^ for regulated price
P'
,
the total of realized and excess demand O" and market clearing
demand without regulation 0. This area is not consumers' loss be-
cause it is excess demand that would not be satisfied in an unregu-
lated market because costs are greater than unregulated prices for
these amounts.
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No one knows how long such annual losses will continue to be
part of the regulatory results in setting gas field prices. At one
extreme, they could continue for the lifetime of an area rate sche-
dule set this year, with the schedule lifetime extending to ten
years. At the other extreme, 1970 would be the last year of excess
demand if the Commission moved rapidly to raise the interim rate
ceilings in the pending cases and to revise upwards those in the
Permian Basin decision. The area rate proceedings themselves have
taken or will take more than five years to complete, so that the
costs of litigation in "one year's regulation" have been repeated
five times over; for comparability of one vear's costs of regulation
with benefits from that one year's activities, the one to ten vears
of benefits have to be divided by five. The negative benefits for
1
unsatisfied consumers range from zero to $12 million.
The income gains of established consumers . Some consumers have
been able to obtain the amounts of gas they demanded, and thev have
gained real Income from the price reductions imposed by the Federal
Power Commission. Their benefits are not likely to be equal to the
amounts no^^7 collected by the producers "subject to refund" after the
area rate proceedings are complete, because these amounts imply much
The difference between this calculation problem and that for benefits
from electricity regulation folloi<?s from the fact that the area rate cases
are not complete, while those analyzed for benefits from electricity regu-
lation have been completed. The assumption leading to the maximum loss of
$12 million is that the area rate reviews will be complete after five year
and that ten years of present value of negative benefits will follow. The
"one vear's" benefits from regulation are J. i^ „ .,^ vt f°^ 1^ years at
r = 15%. In this calculation this 5 Z. "t'^^'*''^^
equals B (1.0037) where B =$12 million. ^
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lower celling prices than those likely to bo put into pffect. In f.ict,
the ceiling prices set in the Permian Basin area rate proceeding were
equal to those on non-regulated transactions in the early 1960's; as
Commissioner O'Connor states in his separate opinion in that proceeding:
"From the record in this proceeding, for the period vjith which we are
concerned, the overwhelming volumes of gas well gas are sold under
new contracts at the weighted average price of 16.5 cents (the area
rate)". As a result, most "refundable collections" on Permian Rasin
production will not be refunded and similar findings on the ceiling
rates elsewhere will have similar results.
The consumers' income gains have been made on contracts signed
for production of reserves after 1965. The amount of the gains de-
pends on the prices that would have been set by purchasers in the ab-
sence of regulation — on price P rather than P' in Figure 2. If the
circumstances were those of no excess demand, the gains were zero
because prices P and P' were approxlmatelv the same. If the circum-
stances were those of excess demand in keeping with $12 million losses
to unsatisfied consumers, the market price P would have been some two
cents higher than the regulated price. The difference (?-?') on the
completed sales O' were the maximum income redistribution f,ains for
"satisfied" consumers.
The consumers' gains here were producers' and government tax
losses. Since the case can be made for net gains onlv on sales to
^ Area Rate Proceeding No. AR61-1, 3A F.P.C. 159, at 265. Similar
findings apply to 'old gas production.
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home consumers, they were limited to that part of new reserve sales
1
made to interstate pipelines for resale to home consumers. In each
of the last few years, approximately 18 trillion cubic feet of new
reserves were dedicated to interstate pipelines under the rate
ceilings, and perhaps 35 per cent of this amount was for delivery
2
to home consumers. Then the pains were limited to two cents per
thousand cubic feet on 6.3 trillion cubic feet, or $126 million
3
each year. The losses in government tax receipts were 50 per cent
of this price reduction, because the petroleum companies would have
paid income taxes in excess of the depletion allowances on the same
amount as their income and then the dividend receivers would have
paid income taxes on it once again. The net income redistribution
gains ~ counting the non-tax losses of dividend receivers not at all
The argument here is the same as for income transfers from
lower electricity prices: all Industrial producers or consumers are
in the same income class, but home consumers are in a lower Ijncome
class; the value of transfer to the lower income class is shown by
the marginal tax treatment of a dollar there rather than to the
gas company's dividend recipients.
2
This percentage assumes that residential and commercial sales are
all "home sales". Cf. the Annual Report of the Federal Power Commis-
sion
, statistics on gas reserves and sales for resale to home con-
sumers in the 1966, 1967, 1968 issues.
3
As in the case of income transfers from reduced electricity prices,
it is assumed that consumers gain (.50-t) dollars for every dollar at
reduced dividend income, and that t=.20 marginal reduced tax rate on
the recipient. Here it has been assumed that (.20+t) holds for de-
pletion revenues, and t=>.30 because of higher incomes earned from
the lower company taxes.
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have been limited to $63 million at a maximum (if there has been a
pas shortage) and zero at a minimum (no shortage).
The problem with these income gains is that they have been
realized on the basis of only interim ceiliny» prices, and these
prices may be lon^^er than the final area prices set in the formal
rate proceedings. Additional rate reviews are likely to restilt in
smaller price reductions in face of pressures from excess demand.
The chance of hif;her prices is great enough that future pains must
be discounted not only at the 15 per cent rate, but must be assumed
to be limited to ten vears. Also, five years are required to com-
plete any of these proceedings, so that the total pains for established
1
consumers have present value of approximately $63 million.
The net benefits to consumers as a proup could have been equal
to the gains of the advantaged of $63 million minus the losses of
the deprived of $12 million. At least such an estimate is plausible,
if not convincing. As likely is the possibtlitv that there was no
excess demand, so that gains and losses were both zero.
The Economic Benefits from Natural Cas Pipeline Regulation
The Federal Power Commission's proceedings on applications bv
the Interstate gas pipelines had the effect of reducing some prices,
and limiting entry in some instances. The amounts of tlie price
This calculation assumes that it will take five years of regula-
tory expenditure to attain ten vears of gains of $63 million per
annum. Both gains and costs occur over roughly the same time period —
although the gains occur mostly at a later date. As a first approxi-
mation, then, costs for one year of regulation times five equal total
regulatory expense, and one year's benefits of $63 million times ten equal
total benefits. For convenience, neither costs nor benefits are given in
total value terms here but rather in terms of one vear's results. Benefits

59
reductions may have been preateir than those associated v/ith repudiation
of electric power prices or f»as field prices. The savings froTn pro-
hibiting entry are unkncwn.
The Federal Power Commission disallo^^7ed $2.7 million of price
increases proposed during the 1968 fiscal vear, as well as $12.0
million of previously-proposed increases. They were responsible in
some part for $13.9 million of rate reductions the last year and
$50.9 million the year before, "\rhich were, in larrre part, flowthrouph
2
of supplier refunds and rate reductions."
All of these reductions mls;ht be credited to the Commission —
none of them might have taken place in the absence of regulatory price
reviews, even though it could have been profitable for the firms to
reduce prices by the announced amounts given cost reductions from in-
creased advantages o<^ scale or other aspects of technical progress.
But even given such a view, credit can be taken in pipeline regulation
only for the former reductions since the latter already has been at-
tributed to field price regulation; and this credit is for reductions
of 10% under unregulated prices at the most, so that the net gains from
3
more consumption APAQ/2 could have equalled no more than $2 million.
Cf. the Federal Power Commission Annual Report (Fiscal Year 1968)
,
p. 59.
2
Op. cit.
, p. 60.
This calculation proceeds in exactly the same fashion as those
for finding consumers' surplus from electricity rate reductions.
Given that (AP) (Q) = $14.69 million, AP/P =• 10 per cent, and the
elasticity of demand is -1.28 as shown by the econometric demand
relations for gas described above, then APAQ/2 = (-. lOP) (-1.28qAP/P)
= (-.10)(-1.28AP.Q) => $1.88 million.
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The accompanying pains from distributing^ stockholders' income to '
consumers were limited by the small consumer participation in final
demand; with 35 per cent of final demand attributable to home con-
sumers and 30 per cent of that equal to the indirect income Rains
from redistribution to "poor" consumers from "rich" stockholders,
1
the net benefits in one year are estimated at $1,5 million. At
most, ten years of pains cotild result from one yonr's rerulation,
so that the present value of the year's activities in settinj^ rates
for natural gas pipeline companies would be $9. A million for
"quantity-increasinj;" regulation and $7.5 million from "income re-
distributing" regulation.
The gains from regulating entry are another matter. Without
any regulation at all in the pineline industry, it would be exnected
that local monopoly pipelines would make extra-normal nrofits until
other, newer lines impinged on their market areas. The additional
transporters would reduce profits to normal levels by reducinr nrices,
but also by duplicating the facilities of existing transporters to
the point where average mileage costs move up to the existing price
level. With effective price rej^ulation, there should be strong dis-
incentives for such entry to take place, because regulated prices
would be reduced to the level of lo^^^est costs for the single transporter.
There is no need for strict entry controls designed to prevent duplica-
tion unless price regulation is ineffective.
'" That is, (.35)(.30)($14.69)(10^) equals $1.5 million.
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The "price reducing" and "quality" regulatlcai activities of
the Comniisslon have been mutually exclusive, particylarlv because
there has been so little dcsne except rate and entry limitation in
the pas pipeline industry. Both have had the goal of reducinp costs
from competition when there have been real ;»ains possible from
econoTYiies of scale in the single transporter. In the precedent
cases, the proceedings have unfortunately centered on limiting com-
petition by makinp market-like choices as to the single source of
supply, but without reference to the alternative resource costs;
Russell has shewn this in three important and recent certification
1
case decisions of the Commission, The main issue was not encountered;
to the extent that price regulation was effective in these instances
of two transporters seeking to provide the same service, entry
regulation was redundant.
The Federal Power Commission makes no claim for cost savings
from limiting entry. Also, the Commission reports no significant
improvements in the quality of service from more regulation; indeed,
the impetus for quality improvement in pipeline safetv has come not
from the regulatory Commission but from Congress and private researchers.
All that can be assumed at this point is that the gains have all been
made by price regulation, whether or not price control has been
"perfect".
Cf. Milton Russell, "Resource Allocation in Utility Certification
Decisions", M.S.U. Public Utilities Studies (E. Lansing, '-lichigan,
1969)
,
pp. 3T^W.
=—
—
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A Review of Costs and Benefits, And an Kcononiic View of Commission Reforin
The impression pained from the Federal Poiv^er Commission's .acti-
vities and the responses of ccmipanles in the electric pcK'fer and
natural gas industries has been one of vigorous and meticulous en-
forcement of regulation. All that activltv cost at least $46 million
during a typical year in the late 1960 "s„ The expenditures were made
to protect the consumer, and some consumers appear to have pained
while other consumers and stockholders lost. The benefits from
Commission-initiated price reductions were not only diverse within a
Commission pronram, but also less than the costs of regulation in some
but not in other programs.
The detailed accounting for benefits and costs In Table 3 points
out the areas of Commission activity most out of balance. The Com-
mission's activities in the pricing of electric power required $3
million of litigation expenses, half o^ which were outlavs of the
regulated companies defending themselves in "cost o*^ service" reviews
or rate cases. In return, the consumers received $A million of in-
direct additions to income and $1 million of sumlus from (imputed)
gains In output. It would appear that $3 million of legal resources
were used to produce only $1 million of additional net value of product
liere. The rest of the (>ains were from F.P.C, taxation — from reducing
the incomes of dividend recipients and increasing those of consinaers.
Other tax authorities have the same mandate, and most probably loiter
costs for completing the mandate.
The costs of particular procedures in power regulation are perhaps much
greater than benefits from those particular procedures, and much greater
than the average benefits and costs shot'?. Correspondence with the power
companies on their costs of regulation pointed to certification procedures
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Field price regulation procedures have been burdensome In
every case, beglnninp with certification of firm sales of new reserves
and continuing with the rate proceedings. The Commission spent more
than $3 million on these activities in 1968^ The indirect expenses
of the companies, from delays in production imposed by certification
and review, and the direct expenses of certification requirements and
litigation, probably came to $30 milllcm that vear. The benefits
directly depended on the extent of price reductions achieved under
area rate rulings. If prices were so reduced as to create shortages,
then consumer losses on output exceeded $12 million and income dis-
tribution pains exceeded $63 million. Once apain, extensive resources
(almost $33 million) were used up to redistribute amounts of income
not much greater ($63 million). But there may have been no excess
demand from reduced prices; in that case there were no benefits (as
shown by the alternative totals in Table 3),
In comparison, the results from pipeline regulation were excellent,
For no more than $6 million of annual outlay on certification and rate
review, the Commission made contributions to consumer rate reductions
modestly estimated to be worth more than $9 million in increased con-
sumers' surplus and $7 million in income redistribution.
The Federal Power Commission must make its o^^m calculations, if
only to provide a check against those attempted here. If thev do,
they may again see the effects from the imbalance of regulatory ac-
tivities. Gas field price regulatory activities must be ten times
more costly than those in the "orthodox" public utilities; that alone
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should raise questions as to whether the bureaucrncv eitlier in or
enpendered by field price regulation has not pro<>m too fast and too
large. The costs of redistributing Income must be more than $33 million
far more than any levy for collectinp income bv the Internal Revenue
Service.
The question is whether the Commission and the rest of the
Government see in the imbalance of benefits and costs from pas field
regulation a lesson in economic reform. Those activities which make
the direct and indirect expenses of producer repulation so f?reat
could be curtailed. The case for price and quantity review on the
sipiiing of a sales contract by a (regulated) producer with a (regu-
lated) pipeline buyer is exceptionally weak. A social costs-receipts
analysis of the crudest sort shW'i's the unsatisfactory state of affairs
here. This puts the alternative to the Commission: regulation of
field prices by automatically certifying* all competitive transactions,
so that other agencies then can move on to redistributing income.
The means are available for doinr so in Commission interpretation of
the Supreme Court's mandate for producer regulation; as elucidated
by Commissioner O'Connor in the Permian Basin Case, "a market price
has been established which provides a reasonable measure of the rate
necessary to elicit supply... There is no substantial difference
between market and costs in the Permian, Either method is presentlv
1
permlssable for purposes of area ratemaking." The Federal Power
Commissioner O'Connor, op. cit.
,
p. 265, (emphasis added).
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Commission has the power to reduce its cwn scale of activities iy
centering Its factual inquiry on determlninR the competitiveness of
markets and then approving all competitive market prices. The costs
of regulation would be reduced to a size comparable to those in
electric power and gas pipeline regulation. Then the policy de-
cision has to do with the wisdom and courage required of an agencv
to reduce itself to one fifth present scale.
The same "agonizinfr reappraisal" should he conducted on elec-
tricity price regulation. This regulation applies only on interstate
transmission of power for wholesale distribution to local utilities,
and regulation has been established ncK7 for a decade, so that the
market conditions and the issues are not quite the same as those in
finding ceiling prices on thousands of pas field sales for the first
time. I5ut the only ne-t benefits are those found in income redistri-
bution, and these taxation-like gains are at the exnense of more than
$2 million of litigation and administrative resources.
There are tv;o arguments for and as manv counterarguments acainst
continuing the day-to-day surveillance procedures in electricity
regulation as they nm^ operate. First, they have the effect of pre-
venting widespread evasion of the rules given in the important pre-
cedent cases, merely by taking place. But suppose thev Hid not? Then
evasion could lead to prices perhaps 15 per cent to 20 per cent higher
on wholesale distribution of pot^/er, without costing as much in re-
1
sources as is used in present litigation and review. Second, they
The vertical distance or ordinate in triangle "H" in Figure 1, when
the area of that triangle does not exceed the costs of regulation of
$3 million.
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resulted in Che consumer obtaining more than $A million of present
value of price reductions in a typical year. But If this were not
the case, then the government itself would have had the present
value of twice this amount in tax receipts on "extra normal" elec-
tricity profits in a typical year. Admittedly, these taxes could
be collected elsewhere. This is a two-sided argument: the "tax"
collected by the F.P.C. and passed through to the consumer?? could
also have been collected by the Internal Revenue Service via even
higher profits levies, but with lower collection costs. The argu-
ments are, at the most, unsettled in the case for wholesale electri-
city regulation as it noiv operates.
Then what can the Commission do? The mandate Is present,
tentatively at least, for continued day-to-day control of pipelines
rates and service (as in Table 3). The mandate is present and un-
tested to Improve the quality and add to the quantity of service
provided by the pipeline and electric pcujer companies. The next
decade will see the Federal Power Commission engaged In the search
for more low cost power and gas — where the costs include those
Imposed on others using air and water resources appropriated by the
utilities. Otherwise, the next decade will see the Commission not
at all.
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